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CLUSTERING AND EXPECTED SEAT-SHARE FOR
DISTRICT MAPS
KRISTOPHER TAPP
Abstract. In the context of modern sampling methods for redistrict-
ing, we define the clustering of a political party (or of a geographic
region), and we study how clustering affects the expected election out-
come.
1. Introduction
The mathematical literature on redistricting and detecting gerrymander-
ing has recently begun to coalesce around sampling methods. The basic idea
is to generate an ensemble of thousands or millions of randomly generated
redistricting plans, and the underlying fairness principle is that an enacted
plan should not be an outlier. Among other things, this means that one po-
litical party’s seat-share should not differ by too many standard deviations
from its average seat-share among the ensemble.
Sampling methods have been applied (and have formed the basis of legal
briefs) for Wisconsin [6], North Carolina [5, 7], Pennsylvania [4] and other
states. The political geography of most of these states (which means the
manner in which Democrat and Republican voters are spatially distributed
across the state, as snapshotted by the vote tallies from a particular race)
results in a structural advantage for Republicans. The sampling methods
allow this structural advantage to be separated from the advantage caused
by an allegedly biased map.
This structural advantage is typically attributed to the way that Demo-
crat voters are packed into dense cities while Republican voters are more
evenly distributed across rural areas (see for example [2]), but this is a bit
vague and speculative. The sampling methods themselves do not illuminate
the reason for structural bias. Other possible causes include the spacial
distribution of non-voters and the state’s redistricting criteria. Precisely
formulating the claim that “Democrats are disadvantaged because they are
packed into cities” requires sampling methods that are much newer than the
claim itself.
Is a political party disadvantaged (with respect to its seat-share averaged
over an ensemble) by being more clustered? Or by being concentrated in
geographical areas that are themselves more clustered? The purpose of this
paper is to propose a definition of “clustering” that allows such questions to
be precisely formulated and studied in the context of sampling methods.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
describe a general setup for modelling a state with two political parties
under the simplifying assumption that everyone votes. In Section 3, we
define the clustering of a political party. Intuitively, this measurement is
lowest when the party’s voters are distributed homogeneously across the
state, and is highest when they are all segregated into one geographically
isolated region of the state. We prove bounds on a party’s average seat-share
in terms of its clustering. With very low clustering, our bounds virtually
guarantee that a majority party will win all of the seats. With very high
clustering, our bounds guarantee an outcome close to proportionality. These
two limit results (for minimal and maximal clustering) are unsurprising; the
value of the bounds is that they interpolate between these two extremes.
In Section 4, we define the clustering of a geographical region, and we
study the effect of clustering on the average seat-share when the political
parties have different concentrations inside and outside the region. This
simple model allows us to isolate and study the “blue city/red country”
phenomenon. Our results are again unsurprising in the limit cases of min-
imal and maximal clustering, agreeing with common sense intuition; what
is new and perhaps useful for other applications is the abstract framework
for addressing (in a general setting, not specific to any particular state or
sampling method) the key question of how political geography affects the
expected outcome of an election.
Finally, the appendix contains a very general inequality for random vari-
ables upon which all of our bounds are based. Readers interested in the
proof details should begin with the appendix.
2. setup
It is common to use a graph G to model a state that must be divided into
k districts. The vertices of G represent the smallest units of population out
of which districts are to be formed (for example, voter tabulation districts,
precincts or wards). Let VERT denote the set of vertices of G. Two vertices
are connected by an edge if the corresponding pair of geographical regions
share a boundary of non-zero length.
The vertices are weighted by a population function p; more precisely, if
v ∈ VERT, then p(v) ∈ (0, 1) represents the fraction of the state’s population
that resides in v. We assume that everyone votes for either party A or party
B, so the population of each vertex v ∈ VERT splits up correspondingly as:
p(v) = pA(v) + pB(v),
where pA(v) (respectively pB(v)) denotes the fraction of the state’s popula-
tion that both resides in v and votes for party A (respectively party B). The
functions {p, pA, pB} on VERT can be applied to any subset C ⊂ VERT in
the obvious additive way; for example, p(C) =
∑
v∈C p(v), and similarly for
pA and pB .
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A district means a subset D ⊂ VERT such that p(D) = 1/k.1 A map
means a partition of VERT into k districts.
Our starting point is a probability function denoted “Pr” on the space
of maps. In this article, we allow Pr to be arbitrary, but in practice one
would have Pr(M) = 0 for any mapM that violates any of the state-specific
redistricting rules like district contiguity, district compactness, and compli-
ance with the Voters Rights Act. For example, Pr might be uniform among
compliant maps, or might be weighted against barely-compliant maps. We
refer to [7, page 7] for an overview of the varying methods that have been
used to create ensembles of maps, including constructive randomized algo-
rithms, optimization algorithms, and MCMC algorithms. In principle, any
ensemble-generation method induces probability function on the space of
maps, but the MCMC approach matches best with the viewpoint of this
paper because it generates an ensemble that can theoretically be proven to
be a random sample from the space of all possible maps with respect to an
explicitly described probability function.
Note that Pr induces a probability function P˜r on the space of districts,
defined such that for any district D,
P˜r(D) =
1
k
·
∑
M∋D
Pr(M),
where the sum is over all maps M that contain D as one of their districts.
Notice that choosing a random district is equivalent to the following two-
step process: first choose a random map, then choose a random one of its k
districts.
3. Partisan Clustering
In this section, we propose a natural way to measure the clustering of the
members the political parties. For this, first consider the vote-share random
variable, V, defined such that for each district D,
V(D) =
pA(D)
p(D)
= k · pA(D),
which is just the fraction of the district that is loyal to party A. Notice
that V is a random variable with respect to P˜r. Denote µV = E(V) and
σ2
V
= Var(V). The following lemma says that µV equals Party A’s statewide
vote-share.
Lemma 3.1. µV = pA(VERT).
This conclusion is very natural. For example, if 35% of the state’s popu-
lation is loyal to party A, the lemma says that on average 35% of a random
district is loyal to party A.
1This is a minor simplification, since typically the district population is only required
to approximately equal 1/k.
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Proof.
µV =
∑
D
P˜r(D) · V(D) =
∑
D
(
1
k
∑
M∋D
Pr(M)
)
· V(D)
=
∑
M
Pr(M) ·
(
1
k
∑
D∈M
V(D)
)
=
∑
M
Pr(M) ·
(∑
D∈M
pA(D)
)
=
∑
M
Pr(M) · pA(VERT) = 1 · pA(VERT).

Definition 3.2. The partisan clustering is: KV =
σ2
V
µV (1−µV )
.
The value KV is defined here with respect to Party A, but it is straight-
forward to verify that the measurement would be unchanged if the roles of
A and B were swapped throughout. In other words, the clustering of Party
A equals the clustering of Party B, which is why the non-party-specific term
“partisan clustering” is appropriate.
According to the appendix, KV ∈ [0, 1] measures the variance of V relative
to the maximal variance possible for the given value of µV , and this maxi-
mum occurs when the support of V is {0, 1}. Values of KV close to zero occur
in the homogeneous situation when all vertices (and hence all districts) have
about the same fraction of party A voters. On the other hand, values of KV
close to 1 occur when a randomly chosen district is very likely to either be
filled entirely with party A voters or contain no party A voters. In natural
applications, we expect this to happen when party A voters are segregated
into a geographically isolated region of the state.
The term “geographically isolated” requires qualification here. Our def-
inition of KV depends not only on the graph G but also on the probability
function Pr. Because of this dependence, “clustering” is not the right word
for what KV measures in certain unnatural mathematically-contrived exam-
ples, like when Pr is uniform among all maps with no regard for contiguity
or other geographical redistricting criteria. But in natural applications, like
when MCMC methods are applied to a particular state with a reasonably
large number of districts, we propose that “clustering” is exactly what KV
measures because of the way that Pr encodes the geography of the state.
Furthermore, unlike graph-theoretic definitions for clustering that depend
only on G, our statistics-based measurement KV can be easily related to the
expectation for the outcome of an election, which is the goal of the remainder
of this section.
For this we consider another random variable. For any fixed map M ,
let S(M) denote the seat-share of party A, which is defined as 1
k
times the
number of districts D of M in which pA(D) > pB(D). Notice that S is a
random variable with respect to Pr. Let µS denote its expected value.
Lemma 3.3. µS = Prob
(
V > 12
)
.
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Proof. For any district D, define δ(D) =
{
1 if pA(D) > pB(D)
0 otherwise
.
Note that pA(D) > pB(D) if and only if V(D) >
1
2 , so:
Prob
(
V >
1
2
)
=
∑
D
P˜r(D) · δ(D) =
∑
D
(
1
k
∑
M∋D
Pr(M)
)
· δ(D)
=
∑
M
Pr(M) ·
(
1
k
∑
D∈M
δ(D)
)
=
∑
M
Pr(M) · S(M) = µS .

Combining Lemma 3.3 with the θ = 12 case of Corollary 5.2 from the
appendix yields the main result of this section:
Proposition 3.4.
(1) µS ≥ (2− 2KV)µ
2
V
− (1− 2KV)µV .
(2) If µV >
1
2 , then µS ≥ 1− KV ·
µV (1−µV )
(µV− 12)
2 .
Proposition 3.4 provides a lower bound on Party A’s expected seat-share.
If one exchange the roles of A and B throughout, then the proposition in-
stead give a lower bound on Party B’s expected seat-share, which is equiv-
alent to an upper bound on Party A’s expected seat-share2. Thus, after ap-
plying the proposition to both parties, one obtain lower and upper bounds
on µS .
The remainder of this section is devoted to explaining and interpreting
Figure 1, which visualizes these upper and lower bounds. To provide context,
we first review the following well-known general bound on µS . Party A’s
seat-share for any map M is bounded in terms of party A’s vote-share µV
as follows: 2µV − 1 ≤ S(M) ≤ 2µV ; see [8, Lemma 1]. In particular,
(3.1) 2µV − 1 ≤ µS ≤ 2µV .
In Figure 1, the black lines represent Equation 3.1, the red curves rep-
resent part (1) of Proposition 3.4 applied to both parties, while the blue
curves represent part (2). The grey shaded regions represent the “feasible”
points (µV , µS) for the given values of KV , where “feasible” means consistent
with all of the inequalities under consideration.
For small values of KV , the blue (Tchebysheff) curves dominate the story
and ensure that a party with a reasonably large majority can expect to win
all of the seats. In fact, in the limit as KV → 0, the area of the grey region
in Figure 1 shrinks to zero and its shape converges to the “majority takes
all” curve shown green in the left graph of the figure.
2This requires the assumption that tied districts are negligibly rare.
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Figure 1. Bounds on Party A’s expected seat-share µS as
a function of Party A’s vote-share µV (for three values of
partisan clustering KV).
For large values of KV , the red curves dominate the story and guarantee
an outcome close to proportionality. In fact, in the limit as KS → 1, the
area of the grey region in Figure 1 shrinks to zero and its shape converges
to the proportionality line µS = µV shown green in the right graph of the
figure.
In summary, a majority party will favor low clustering (winning all the
seats), while a minority party will favor high clustering (achieving propor-
tionality). But that’s not the whole story. The next section shows that a
minority party can hope for better than proportionality if their opponents
are packed into a geographical region like a city.
4. A city/country model
In the previous section, we defined the clustering of a political party. In
this section, we similarly define the clustering of a geographical region, and
we analyze a simple model in which one party is more highly concentrated
in such a region.
Let C ⊂ VERT be nonempty. We will refer to C as the city, although
we allow it to be an arbitrary subset, and we will refer to its complement,
C = {v ∈ VERT | v /∈ C}, as the country. Consider the “city” random
variable, C, defined such that for each district D,
C(D) =
p(D ∩ C)
p(D)
= k · p(D ∩C),
which is just the fraction of the population of the district that lies in the city.
Notice that C is a random variable with respect to P˜r. Denote µC = E(C)
and σ2
C
= Var(C).
Lemma 4.1. µC = p(C).
We omit the proof of this lemma because it is similar Lemma 3.1.
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Definition 4.2. The clustering of C is: KC =
σ2
C
µC(1−µC)
∈ [0, 1].
It is straightforward to verify that the clustering of C equals the clustering
of C; that is; the clustering of the city equals the clustering of the country.
Values for KC close to zero occur when all districts have about the same
degree of overlap with the city; in natural applications, this happens when
C is something like a random sample of the vertices. On the other hand,
values of KC close to 1 occur when a randomly chosen district is very likely
to be either entirely inside or entirely outside C; that is, when there is only
a small probably of partial overlap. In natural applications, we expect this
to happen when the city is geographically isolated3 and the size of a district
is small relative to the size of the city.
In the remainder of this section, we present a simple model that assumes
that the city the country are individually homogeneous, with the city’s con-
centration x of party A voters larger than the country’s concentration y.
The main result of this section is the following bound on Party A’s expected
seat share µS in this situation:
Proposition 4.3. Assume there are constants x, y ∈ (0, 1) with y < 12 < x
such that pA(v) = x for all v ∈ C, and pA(v) = y for all v ∈ C. Denoting
δ = x− y, we have:
(1) µS ≥ µC ·
KC(1−µC)δ+µV−
1
2
δ(1−µC)+µV−
1
2
.
(2) If µV >
1
2 then µS ≥ 1−
4KCδ
2µC(1−µC)
(2µV−1)2
.
The hypothesis y < 12 < x represents the only non-obvious case (after
possibly swapping the roles of A and B), since x, y being on the same side
of 12 would make µS equal 0 or 1.
Proof. Notice that
V = x · C+ y · (1− C).
In particular,
(4.1) µV = x · µC + y · (1− µC), and σ
2
V = (x− y)
2 · σ2C.
Part (2) is obtained from the θ = 12 case of Proposition 5.1(2) as follows:
µS = Prob
(
V >
1
2
)
≥ 1−
σ2
V(
µV −
1
2
)2 = 1− 4δ2σ2C(2µV − 1)2
= 1−
4δ2K2
C
µC(1− µC)
(2µV − 1)
2 .
3As in the previous section, terms like “geographically isolated” are only appropriate
for natural examples in which Pr encodes the geography of the state.
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But part (1) can NOT be proven with an analogous computation; rather,
it is proven using Proposition 5.1(1) with θ =
1
2
−y
x−y
:
µS = Prob
(
V >
1
2
)
= Prob
(
C >
1
2 − y
x− y
)
≥
2(x− y)µ2
C
+ (2y − 1)µC + 2(x− y)σ
2
C
2x− 1
=
µC(
x− 12
) ((x− y)(1− KC)µC + (x− y)KC + y − 1
2
)
.
Solving the system {µV = x · µC + y(1− µC), δ = x− y} for {x, y} yields
(4.2) x = δ + µV − δµC, y = µV − δµC.
Making these substitutions completes the proof of part (1). 
Proposition 4.3 provides a lower bound on Party A’s expected seat-share.
If one exchange the roles of A and B throughout, then the proposition in-
stead give a lower bound on Party B’s expected seat-share, which is equiv-
alent to an upper bound on Party A’s expected seat-share. Thus, after
applying the proposition to both parties, one obtains both lower and upper
bounds on µS .
Our next goal is to explain and interpret Figure 2, which visualizes these
lower and upper bounds (with some of the constants set to particular values).
For this, first notice that the hypothesis 0 < y < 12 < x < 1 is really four
inequalities, which get converted by Equation 4.2 into:
(4.3) max
{
δµC,
1
2
− δ(1 − µC)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
< µV < min
{
1
2
+ δµC, 1− δ(1 − µC)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
.
It is natural to consider {µC, δ} as fixed constants, and define a, b in terms
of them via by Equation 4.3. This is what’s done in the following example,
upon which Figure 2 is based.
Example 4.4. Suppose that µC = .3 (that is, 30% of the population lives
in the city) and δ = .4 (that is, Party A’s concentration is 40% higher in
the city than in the country). These values yield a = .22 and b = .62.
So the only interesting situation is when Party A’s statewide vote share is
µV ∈ (.22, .62), which is the domain of the graphs in Figure 2. Outside
of this domain, a single party would have a majority in both the city and
the country, yielding µS = 0 or µS = 1. Inside of this domain, how should
we visualize µV increasing from .22 to .62? Since δ = .4 is fixed, we must
imagine x and y increasing linearly together, in this case from (x, y) = (.5, .1)
when µV = .22 to (x, y) = (.9, .5) when µV = .62.
Figure 2 illustrates Example 4.4 for various choices of KC. The black lines
represent Equation 3.1, the red curves represent part (1) of Proposition 4.3
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applied to both parties, while the blue curves represent part (2). The grey
shaded regions represent the “feasible” points (µV , µS) for the given values
of KC, where “feasible” means consistent with all of the inequalities under
consideration.
Figure 2. Seat-share bounds when µC = .3 and δ = .4.
For values of KC close to 0, the blue (Tchebysheff) curves dominate, and
the story reduces to results from the previous section; in fact, the equations
of the blue curves really just depend on the amount of partisan clustering,
and not on anything specific to the city/country model.
For values of KC close to 1, only the red curves are relevant to the story.
Figure 2 indicates something that is easily verified by Proposition 4.3(1);
namely, as KC → 1, the area of the grey region approaches zero, while its
shape approaches a horizontal line at height µC (shown green in the right
graph of the figure).
Returning to Example 4.4, µC = .3, so when the city is highly clustered,
party A’s expected seat-share is forced to be close to 30%, provided its
statewide vote-share is anywhere between a = 22% and b = 62%. When
this vote-share is close to b = 62%, this represents a very poor outcome for
party A; in fact, it’s close to the worst-case outcome that’s explored in the
next example.
Example 4.5. When δ = 12 , Equation 4.3 becomes (a, b) =
(
1
2µC,
1
2 +
1
2µC
)
.
To construct examples in which a majority party does as poorly as is theo-
retically possible, set
δ =
1
2
, µV ≈ b =
1
2
+
1
2
µC , KC ≈ 1.
This yields
µS ≈ µC ≈ 2µV − 1,
where “≈” means “arbitrarily close to.” Equation 3.1 says that this is a
lower bound on the seat-share with respect to any map, so it’s interesting
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that it can be approximately attained as a lower bound on the average seat-
share (averaged over all maps); thus, all maps are poor for party A. Notice
here that (x, y) ≈ (1, .5), so this example is a limit-case version of the story
in which one party is highly concentrated in the city while holding a slight
minority in the country.
In conclusion, our bounds roughly agree with common sense intuition in
the limit cases as KC approaches 0 and 1; furthermore, the bounds provide a
general framework that interpolates between these limit cases. Even in the
limit case, some care is needed to avoid oversimplification. For example, it
would be an oversimplification to categorically claim that a political party is
disadvantaged by being concentrated in a city. In fact, “the city” and “the
country” play symmetric roles in the model, and each party is concentrated
in one of these regions. The truth is that concentration in a highly clustered
region causes a party’s expected seat-share to be close to the size of the
region. This can be advantageous or disadvantageous depending on the al-
ternative to which it’s being compared. Compared to a political geography
with low partisan clustering (which roughly yields a majority-takes-all out-
come), it’s advantageous for the minority party but not the majority party.
Compared to a political geography with high partisan clustering (which
roughly yields proportionality), Example 4.4 demonstrated that it can be
advantageous or not, depending on whether the choice of µV ∈ (.22, .62) is
larger or smaller than µC = .3.
5. APPENDIX: General Variance Bounds
Proposition 5.1. Suppose that X is a random variable with support in
[0, 1], and θ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant. Denoting µ = E(X) and σ2 = Var(X),
we have:
[Bhatia-Davis] σ2 ≤ µ(1− µ).
Furthermore:
(1) Prob (X > θ) ≥ σ
2+µ(µ−θ)
1−θ .
(2) [Tchebysheff] If µ > θ, then Prob (X > θ) ≥ 1−
(
σ
µ−θ
)2
.
The Bhatia-Davis inequality from [1] says more generally for a random
variable with support in [m,M ] that σ2 ≤ (µ − m)(M − µ). Part (2) of
Proposition 5.1 is a straightforward application of Tchebysheff’s Inequality.
Part (1) is related to the Bhatia-Davis inequality as follows: if σ2 > µ(θ−µ),
then the Bhatia-Davis inequality implies that X could not have support in
[0, θ], and indeed this is exactly the cutoff after which part (1) concludes
that Prob(X > θ) > 0.
Proof of part (1) of Proposition 5.1. Define
F =
σ2 + µ (µ− θ)
1− θ
− Prob (X > θ) .
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x Prob(X = x)
0 1− a− 1
θ
(µ − a)
θ 1
θ
(µ− a)
1 a
Table 1. The extreme case: the support of F is in {0, θ, 1}.
We wish to prove that F ≤ 0. First observe that if the support of X is in
{0, θ, 1}, then the probability function for X has the form of Table 1, where
a = Prob(X = 1) = Prob (X > θ). In this case, writing σ2 in terms of a
and then solving for a yields: a = µ
2−θµ+σ2
1−θ , which means F = 0. So to
prove that F ≤ 0, we must demonstrate that this is the extreme case that
maximizes F .
Assume for now that X has finite support {a1, ..., an} ⊂ [0, 1], and let pi
denote the probability of ai, so µ =
∑
piai and σ
2 =
∑
pi(µ − ai)
2. Notice
that ∂µ
∂a1
= p1. Assume that a1 /∈ {0, θ, 1}. The following computation is
similar to the first proof of [1]:
∂F
∂a1
=
1
(1− θ)
·
(
2p1(a1 − µ)− 2p1
∑
pi(ai − µ)
)
+
p1
(1− θ)
· (2µ− θ)
=
2p1
(1− θ)
(
a1 −
θ
2
)
.
There are three cases to consider. If a1 ∈
(
0, θ2
)
, then moving a1 left
towards 0 increases F . If a1 ∈
(
θ
2 , θ
)
, then moving a1 right towards θ
increases F . If a1 ∈ (θ, 1), then moving a1 right towards 1 increases F .
From this, it follows that F is maximized when the support of X is {0, θ, 1},
as desired.
The case where X does not have finite support can be obtained by a
standard limit approximation argument. 
According to the Bhatia-Davis inequality, the value K = σ
2
µ(1−µ) ∈ (0, 1)
measures the size of the variance relative to the maximal variance possible
for the given value of µ. Proposition 5.1 can be easily rephrased in terms of
K (rather than σ) as follows:
Corollary 5.2. Suppose that X is a random variable with support in [0, 1],
and θ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant. Denote µ = E(X) and σ2 = Var(X). Assume
µ /∈ {0, 1} and define K = σ
2
µ(1−µ) ∈ (0, 1). Then
(1) Prob (X > θ) ≥ 11−θ
(
(1− K)µ2 + (K− θ)µ
)
.
(2) (Tchebysheff) If µ > θ, then Prob (X > θ) ≥ 1− K · µ(1−µ)
(µ−θ)2
.
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